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Abstract 
 
 This case provides insight regarding how the survival of a company exercising 
its economic activity on a capital intensive industry, namely Cimpor – Cimentos de 
Portugal, SGPS, S.A., can be more affected during a financial/economic crisis than 
companies operating in non transformation sectors. Company performance positively 
correlated with the market and, the need for large amounts of debt capital required for 
survival, were key factors whenever a recession were in order. I will explore the factual 
evidence of such events, providing in the end a space for reflection through a set of 
questions concerning the approached subjects. 
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I. Environment constraints 
Since 1976, banks had been the primary source of external capital for CIMPOR – 
Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS, S.A. (Cimpor). With the increasing degree of openness over 
financial markets, on 2003 Cimpor started sourcing for capital outside the banking sector.  
Acquiring credit has always been subject to dynamic relations between creditors and 
the borrower. Due to the irreversible nature of the investments undertaken by this cement mid 
size player, evaluating firm’s ability to fulfill contract obligations had been a subject to 
meticulous evaluation by lending institutions, until credit rating agencies reputational buildup. 
Until 2009, which shall be used as reference period for the case, debt ratings provided by 
rating agencies often justified no further use of bank’s own risk measurement models. 
This evidence became even more acute upon the opening of the national banking 
sector to foreign bank institutions during the 1990’s. Access to foreign lenders by Cimpor had 
led the firm to build up relationships with those entities, as they were representing a brand 
new offer of much competitive products. 
On implementing an internationalization strategy, external capital had been of the 
utmost importance for Cimpor’s growth and development. This way, liabilities became 
increasingly pushing weight over company’s operations and activities by capitalizing a large 
part of the left side of its balance sheet and eroding therefore, a large part of revenues. 
With such encumbering, credit risk management decisions undertaken by the Area of 
Financial Operations (AOF) had constantly been subject to a dynamic set of management 
practices, all in line with firm’s main objective of shareholder value maximization. 
By 2008, Cimpor had outstanding EUR 1.911 million long term financial debt. 
According to risk management practices for debt instrument diversification undertaken by the 
firm’s management team, debt was dispersed though various different facilities, most of them 
undertaken between 2003 and 2008. Amongst concomitant implications involving debt 
contraction, major maturities implied repayment over the next 3 years following 2009.  
It was clear that financing and refinancing contracts until 2007 had been eased on 
encumbering costs, by business’s healthiness and expanding economic environmental. 
However, the credit crunch of 2007-2008 started affecting banks and firms surrounding the 
bank balance crisis. This trust crisis was by 2009 beginning limiting firm’s access to buyers’ 
credit as banks, pension funds, fixed income investors, among others were starting to back 
down on refinancing agreements over firm’s building maturities. 
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Providing that such behavior could be only the tip of the crisis iceberg, restructuring 
long term goals appeared to be a comprehensible agenda as with default avoidance, a need of 
cash allocation from investment to financing activities became evident. 
With an increase over the firm’s cost of capital, many of the positive Net Present 
Value (NPV) projects were at the verge of being reversed to negative figures. Regardless of 
that, Cimpor management team were still believing in the fruit yet to be collected from a 
sudden exponential burst of employed capital undertaken since 2003.  
Shareholders opinions were already diverging and, in line with Chava and 
Purnanandam (2008)
2
, a valuation loss over Cimpor’s equity was taking place. According to 
the authors, during a financial and economic crisis sustaining major credit supply shocks, 
such loss can be mainly traced to the association of bank-dependent firms such as Cimpor to 
banks that see their internal health damaged by massive losses traced back to substantial 
defaulting on outstanding balance loans.  
High systematic risk exposure associated with such unleavened net debt balance and 
also with the closing of financial covenants disclosed over most important contracts, Standard 
and Poor’s rating agency (S&Ps) undertook a downgrade action over Cimpor’s long term 
obligations. As the above mentioned contracts included interest rate indexation with S&Ps 
long term credit rating, an irrational set of conditions worsening was occurring. Cimpor had 
relevant international credit rating solely provided by S&Ps. 
Along with public investment, Cimpor was being led to a dramatic set of action having 
as basis significant cuts on investment and CAPEX. With firm’s decaying liquidity, two 
possible outcomes were expected. The positive one involved economic recovery based on the 
possibility of a new restructured state plan based on the American New Deal assumptions, 
returning this way firm’s bargaining margins over contract renegotiations to high standards. 
The remaining possibility involved either asset sales for contractual obligations fulfillment or, 
a capital increase that, given the depreciated financial position of its major shareholders, could 
probably be feasible of being undertaken by solely one of those same entities, namely Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos, S.A. (CGD) or, by any new player becoming shareholder of the firm. 
At the beginning of 2009 Cimpor was being obliged to overcome the already 
abominable snowman of pushed forward financing outflows. Re-establishing creditors’ 
confidence through guarantee deed contracts for business-risk to bank-risk transfer and, S&Ps 
further downgrade avoidance either through contract renegotiations or liquidity increase was 
on top of agenda for financial management team. As banking credit was drying especially that 
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supplied by foreign financial institutions, the possibility favoring debt emissions over 
financial markets on the long/medium range was an option, as denoted by Lim (2003)
11
. 
Regardless on the effectiveness of those measures, Cimpor had to offset those challenges if it 
were to return to the high yields of returns to investor growth pattern displayed over the seven 
years preceding 2009. 
  
II.  Firm History and Debt Profile 
Cimpor has been operating in the capital intensive cement industry since 1976, being 
on the beginning of 2009 the Portugal national market leader of the cement, concrete and 
aggregates sector. Its international growth and development strategy made it present on the 
reference period over 13 different markets, dispersed among 4 different continents as can be 
seen in Figure A1. During this period, Cimpor was on an exponential phase of its expansion. 
The need for external financing by this company had been as constant as its margins 
for 5 consecutive years, with an average return on equity of 18,8% between 2002 and 2007, 
and an average debt to equity ratio of 1,72 for the same period. Table B1 and Table B1.1 
summarize in average, financial data for Cimpor between 2002 and 2008. 
Being considered a known company in the sector by 2009 spring semester, Cimpor 
was positioned on the eight place of the best world performers regarding installed capacity, 
right bellow players such as Cemex SAB de CV (Cemex), Lafarge Ciments S.A. (Lafarge) 
and Holcim Ltd. (Holcim).  
Cimpor’s leveraging profile were directly associated to investment pattern. The 
grounds behind strategic prospects for long term growth were supported by a constant market 
consolidation environment, implying as rules of engagement intensive capital growth by 
acquisition financed by buyers’ credit and own capital. With that in mind, Cimpor had on the 
reference period prospects for reaching 5% growth capacity until 2012. With a solid and 
liquid base of credit between 2002 and 2008, the firm had consecutively been able to pay off 
its obligations towards shareholders through growing cash dividend yield observable in 
Figure A2. 
Since mid 2007, a downward spiral of investors trust over Cimpor’s performance can 
be depicted from the 672.000.000 outstanding shares of stock quotation behavior, observable 
in Figure A3. A peak value had taken place on the second semester of 2007, followed by 
downward spiral until reaching minimal values. 
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For an improved insight over market conditions depreciation starting on the above 
mentioned year, Figure A4 demonstrates not only the market behavior, but also the positive 
correlation that it has with the firm. Then, it can be said that Cimpor’s market share was not 
dependent on marketing strategies, but instead on a process of market consolidation through 
acquisition of local assets for production and distribution of the final product. This especially 
since the cement producer had no room for much product innovation, relying hence on its 
ability to acquire smaller local players, and also to avoid being acquired by larger players. 
All over the 1990’s, companies began to source more actively for foreign debt 
supplied by international players new to the national banking sector. Those entities 
approached companies with offerings for competitive credit products that implied 
increasingly more competitive terms than those offered by national entities at the time. Being 
Cimpor already on that period an important player at national level, it also started seeking 
foreign credit in order to finance its strategic goals. 
 
Table 1. Cimpor outstanding liabilities structure by 2007 and 2008 
 (Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
 
2008 
 
2007 
 
Change 
Long Term Liabilities: 
     
 
Bonds 
 
883.055  
 
855.939  
 
3,07% 
Bank Loans 1.028.075 
 
467.993 
 
119,68% 
Other Loans - 
 
315 
 
-100% 
 
1.911.130 
 
1.324.247 
 
44,32% 
      
Short Term Liabilities: 
     
 
Bank Loans 
 
201.177  
 
623.142  
 
-67,72% 
Other Loans 324 
 
340 
 
-4,71% 
 
201.401 
 
623.482 
 
-67,70% 
 
2.112.631 
 
1.947.729 
 
8,47% 
 
Source: Cimpor 2008 annual report
4
; Company documentation
5 
 
Financial markets globalization efforts also brought new options in terms of corporate 
bonds. With access to recent fast growing international and foreign fixed income markets 
issuing a demand for longer maturity investor class products than those offered by banks, ever 
since 2003 Cimpor had taken steps towards corporate bond issuance, seeking external 
financing on public and private markets.  
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At the beginning 2009, firm’s debt structure was composed mainly by an instruments 
mix ranging from credit supplied from banks to bond instruments. Major creditors and debt 
holders were Banks, Insurance Companies, Fund Managers, Pension Funds. Total liabilities 
outstanding on the Firm’s balance sheet of the 2008 annual consolidated report are disclosed 
on Table 1 above and Table B2. Total debt with a book value of nearly EUR 2.112.million 
was divided through EUR 201 million short term liabilities, and EUR 1.911 million long term 
debt capital. 
According to the risk management policies undertaken by firm’s financial managers, 
the above total debt was divided among several outstanding debt instruments displayed in 
Figure 1 bellow. At the end of 2008, 52% of total debt was Bank Loans leaving the remaining 
46% and 2 % to 3 fixed income instruments and issued commercial paper respectively. 
 
Figure 1 Major instruments composing Cimpor’s total outstanding debt between 2002 
and 2008  
Source: Cimpor 2002 - 2008 annual reports
4
; Company documentation
5
 
 
Short term financing were usually resourced though overdrafts, commercial paper and 
short term bank loans, though commercial paper and overdrafts could be considered rolling 
instruments.  
Other means of raising capital or improving the use of debt funding implicated firm’s 
access to derivative instruments. With options ranging from warrants, convertible debt, and so 
on, Cimpor could had managed to create a much more exotic instrument mix rendering 
through this way better and increasingly complex terms for either new or renegotiated credit.  
Despite that, Cimpor did not have in its portfolio derivate facilities such as convertible 
bonds, for the obvious reasons concomitant with its shareholder’s protection policy.  
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During the reference period, despite having only three fixed income instruments 
outstanding, those nearly represented 46% of Cimpor’s outstanding debt. Regardless of such 
figures on 2008, that had not always been the frame, as can be observed on Figure 2 bellow.  
 
Figure 2. Percentage decomposition of Cimpor's outstanding long term debt between 
Corporate Bonds and Bank Loans from 2002 until 2008 
Source: Cimpor 2002 - 2008 annual reports
4
; Company documentation
5
 
 
For further digging regarding this matter, Table 2 bellow displays detailed information 
concerning firm’s major Long Term debt instruments face values. Tables B3, B3.1 and B3.2 
display accrued values of firm’s debt between 2002 and 2008.  
 
Table 2. Cimpor's 2008 end outstanding long term debt face values 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
 
*Exchange rate used for converting USD to EUR of 1,1720 retrieved on 26.JUN.2008  
**European Investment Bank  
***Santander&Totta 
 Source: Cimpor 2008 Annual report
4
; Company privately held reports
5
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Bond debt value concentration had arisen mainly due to the common procedure for 
selling corporate bonds involving market best effort, usually mediated by banking institutions. 
This last permissive made emissions under EUR 500 million most of the times unreliable and 
unprofitable for these intermediaries, as commissions usually involved a percentage over face 
value being negotiated. 
At the beginning of 2009, given the decline in business performance, firm’s financial 
managers concerns were mainly directed towards the EUR 600 million Eurobonds bullet 
repayment on 2011 and also, towards the EUR 300 million Bilateral Loan with a similar 
repayment method to take place on the year of 2010. 
Justifying debt values presented by Cimpor’s 2008 annual report were the expansive 
strategic financing requirements that the firm had by that time. Being Cimpor a company 
operating in a capital intensive industry, acquisition of assets such cement plants, investments 
considered has being most of the times irreversible, required injections of capital in the order 
of the hundreds of millions of Euros.  
Cimpor never resourced to stock issuance as a financing method. Given that at the 
beginning of 2009, major investor’s structure, displayed on Figure A5, were already suffering 
from firm’s depreciated incomes compared to previous years, requesting capital increases was 
considered an unreliable option, considering shareholder protection policy. 
Debt was and had been therefore, the main and only source of external capital, starting 
the firm on 2003 to diversify its sources from 100% bank loans provided either by 
commercial or non commercial banking institutions. The main question for firm’s financial 
managers since that year had been which type instrument to use. 
  
III. Debt Management at Cimpor 
Company’s interest on issuance of corporate bonds on either public or private equity 
markets came mainly from the terms that such contracts implied. In contrast to Bank Loans, 
Fixed Income contracts had longer term maturities, usually not shorter than 5 years, any S&Ps 
rating indexation, less restrictive covenants, fixed coupons and full principal repayment at 
maturity.  
The comparable higher maturities coming at higher interest rate yields were very 
attractive to the firm given that one other characteristic of investments in the cement, concrete 
and aggregates sector, was the implication of having payback periods much higher than the 
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common 5 years demanded by investors on other industries. Eurobonds solely represented a 
tax advantage for the firm, as this type of facilities was issued without withholding tax. 
Book building and benchmark practices characterized the bond pricing process, being 
Cimpor’s emissions commonly compared to other emissions issued either by the firm or by 
companies sharing similar conditions to those faced by the firm. A disadvantage posed by 
these securities usually came from the issuer being the seller and not the client, which usually 
carried less room for trade margin over expensive negotiations. 
On 2003, Cimpor had issued 2 different tranches of US Private Placements securities 
(USPPs), therefore not subject to US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation, 
yielding at different maturities, coupons and durations. The issuance took place in the 
transatlantic market in accordance with a debt instrument diversification strategy underling 
company’s risk and financing cost management policies. 
Being Cimpor an international company, Cimpor Financial Operations B.V. (Cimpor 
BV) had been created by the Group with the sole responsibility of the Corporate Bond 
issuance. For more information regarding the Group organizational structure, please see 
Annex I located in Appendix C. 
Another subject arising from having international presence was the need for 
contracting debt in different currencies, as can be observed in Table B4, carrying these 
instruments therefore, an added currency risk. 
Despite very constrictive, debt contracts had room for planning flexibility, in respect 
to market expectations and its relation with cost planning. 
Usually, long term contracted liabilities, regardless of their nature, had clauses stating 
that interest payments could be changed from a biannual basis to a quarterly or even monthly 
one. Though this way, the firm could use to its advantage market expectations in order to 
minimize financing costs associated to floating interest rate instruments. However, with more 
frequent payments, added trade commission disbursement per periodic payments would come. 
Taking the above tradeoff into consideration, on the referenced period, the interest 
payment schedule for Cimpor’s long term major liabilities was distributed through annual, 
semiannual and monthly payments.  
Floating interest rates were mostly associated to Bank Loan contracts, being usually 
the result of summing a floating index, to a contracted fixed Spread. On Cimpor’s debt 
portfolio outstanding at 2009 beginning, the main index accounting for such calculation were 
Euribor, whose variations can be seen in Figure A6.  
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On the above period, the company had in its debt balance two bilateral contracts, being 
them the Bilateral Loan S.T., contracted for refinance purposes only and, the EIB loan 
contracted with the aim of of financing a specific project. Both contracts had on one side one 
lender and, on the other side, one single borrower. Club Deals were usually characterized by 
being loans where either one single borrower or, several borrowers being joint liable towards 
the lenders, received financing from 2 to 3 different lenders sharing the same risk amongst 
them, distributed by equal tranches of the face value of the loan. Other types of loans usually 
contracted by the firm were Syndicated, where between to 10 to 30 lenders shared the risk of 
lending the necessary capital by equal or not amounts of capital. Despite on the reference 
period not having any of these type of facility outstanding, the firm had issued such contracts 
on the past, having one of them the imposing of a rating trigger clause. This term implied that 
in the advent of Cimpor crossing the investment grade barrier, an immediate full repayment of 
capital plus accrued interest would had to take place.  
Besides the already mentioned main differences between contracted debt and issued 
debt, credit supply availability made Cimpor a Bank Dependent since 1976. Given that the 
firm resourced mostly to commercial Bank institutions, pricing competition had resulted on 
lower spreads over supplied interest rates. However, with 2008’s, credit crunch, banks 
intended to preserve their balances. With such trend, Cimpor management team was already 
considering a new issuance to be undertaken on 2010 aiming to refinance the EUR 300M 
Bilateral ST. With extensive written contracts, bank loans were often subject to protecting 
covenants, aiming to preserve firm’s ability to repay owned capital, being one example, the 
Negative Pledge clause present in almost all major contracts. 
Cash needed to be available on interest and principal payment dates, otherwise an 
indemnity had to be paid and, on most contracts, default would be declared. Refinancing 
those contracts upon technical default could be very problematic for the firm since, as stated 
by Chava and Roberts (2008)
3
, a decrease in cash allocated to investment, undermining the 
strategic expansive objectives for the firm and delivering great debt costs escalations and 
possible control hand over to creditor entities, was a probable outcome at the event of default.  
The evidence became more acute when the authors revealed that whilst relations 
where quite superficial between lender and borrower, such problems could go sky-high, 
implicating almost complete cease of investing activities in order to produce a correct 
allocation of cash to debt repayment requirements. Therefore, good relations between 
borrower and lender were one top priority for the firm seeing its bargaining power over 
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negotiations constantly being further depreciated given the credit supply crunch raised by the 
trust crisis. Ability to influence lenders perspectives regarding firm’s ability to repay its 
obligations was of the utmost importance, and given that debt holders usually were well 
informed, knowing well their expectations could be regarded as an advantage for Cimpor 
effectively achieving competitive outcomes from such negotiations. 
Financial planning was then crucial for the firm’s healthiness, implying thorough 
calculations of future expenses associated to financial leverage.  
 
Table 3. Cash outflows from major debt instruments outstanding on 2009, scheduled 
from 2008 until 2015  
 (Monetary values in thousands of Euros)  
Year Interest* Principal Cash outflow 
2008 77.263.009 6.666.667 83.929.676 
2009 89.731.912 119.166.667 208.898.579 
2010 73.712.615 508.333.333 582.045.948 
2011 64.140.436 804.166.667 868.307.103 
2012 30.843.749 172.549.020 203.392.769 
2013 21.432.862 173.868.701 195.301.563 
2014 16.521.163 12.549.019 29.070.182 
2015 7.573.544 229.272.569 236.846.113 
Total 381.219.291 2.026.572.642 2.407.791.933 
*Interest rates used for computing future interest payments resourced from forward rates supplied by 
Cimpor on April, 2009 
 
Source: Cimpor 2008 Annual report
4
; Company documentation
5 
 
On the reference period, Cimpor had so far been able to balance its financial expense 
accounts with its EBITDA margins, as displayed on Figure A7. With those figures always 
higher than 25%, along with an increasingly relatively constant financial expense pattern and 
interest coverage ratios over 4,57x, business healthiness had been proved over and over.  
Debt coverage ratio variations were mainly justified by contract terms agreed for 
capital amortization and interest schedules.  
By associating this evidence of an apparent dynamic financial planning, either with the 
contractive economic consequences over yearly marginal generated EBITDA, and also with 
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the figures disclosed over data transferred from Table 3 above to Figure 3 bellow, firm’s 
managers started to realize a problem that had been constantly growing under the radar. 
 
Figure 3. Cimpor cash outflows associated to outstanding long term debt facilities 
principal repayment between 2008 and 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company reports
5 
Having in mind that capital intensive investments had been undertaken on a basis that 
EBITDA generated from acquired capacity would compensate added financing costs from 
increased, consecutive financing had been being raised between 2002 and 2008 by the firm’s 
managers. Table 4 bellow captures those expectations through a demonstration of an 
exponential growth on amounts due on years following 2009, since 2002. 
The main problems being faced by the firm on the beginning of 2009 where 
considered by management team as resulting from a combination of past blurred market 
expectations that failed to predict the abrupt market downturn. 
 
Table 4. Principal repayment scheduled from 2002 until and after 2009, on the 31
st
 
December of each year between 2002 and 2008 
 (Monetary values in thousands of Euros)  
 
Estimation date starting on the 31st December of respective year 
Year 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
2003 - - - - - - 552.072 
2004 - - - - - 329.710 409.355 
2005 - - - - 150.749 456.143 453.693 
2006 - - - 31.060 141.963 132.314 37.509 
2007 - - 51.427 19.514 148.360 136.565 43.005 
2008 - 623.142 407.945 417.382 80.930 73.080 12.501 
2009 201.177 74.902 15.445 15.399 14.149 0 0 
After 2009 1.911.131 1.249.345 934.015 964.721 922.871 399.705 0 
Total 2.112.630 1.947.729 1.417.661 1.453.556 1.464.585 1.531.405 1.520.935 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 – 2008
4
; Company documentation
5 
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The irrational exuberance felt between 2002 and 2007 raised from an economic boom 
might had led managers all over the world to a belief where the golden egg chicken would 
endure for unforeseeable consecutive future periods, in a form of constant EBITDA margins 
increase, along with low spreads allocated to financing capital. Regardless of its origin being 
synthesized from a clouded but unavoidable human judgment and concomitant perspective, in 
periods of abundance Cimpor’s tendency from operating on a consolidative market basis was 
to use as an advantage the excess supply felt over the credit market to achieve better credit 
conditions for its expansion. However, as the firm intended to keep growing until its terminus, 
investment opportunities on the cement sector tended to be undertaken based on a competitive 
perspective of capacity increase for market capture. Hence, push-forwarding capital 
repayment for proper cash allocation to investment activity might have missed the premise 
that grains of obligations kicked to the future might had ended up filling the golden chicken’s 
stomach on the future, especially if it were to suffer from an economic/financial indigestion. 
 
IV. Snow Ball financial planning strategies 
The cement industry, regardless of the different strategic plans adopted by its players 
(Greenfields Vs Growth by Acquisition), had always required huge loads of capital injections. 
Cimpor’s yearly capital employed in its businesses between 2002 and 2008 had kept 
increasing over the period, culminating with an Indian market entry. For a good insight over 
the strategic pattern of decisions involving investment, maintenance and financing undertaken 
by the firm, Figure A8 displays  the main figures by whose those are reflected. 
When comparing variations on capital employed and cash outflows from investment 
with generated operational revenue variations, there is an apparent deficit. 
Cross referencing this set of data with the debt contraction profile had led firm’s 
financial managers to uncovering an active problem requiring immediate action to be 
undertaken by firm’s executives. Following EBITDA evolutionary trend, realistic forecasts 
were indicating that there would be not enough capital available by 2011 for complying with 
all financing obligations for that year, which would be a common situation for the mid size 
player if not so entrapped by a recessive economic environment. Figure 4 bellow displays the 
Cross Default Swaps (CDSs) traded over Cimpor’s major and larger competitors Holcim and 
Lafarge at values of approximately 600 basis points (bp), and Heidelberger Cement A.G 
(Heildelberger) above the 4000 bp bracket were reflecting investors’ perspectives.  
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A dynamic financial planning concerning financial liabilities portfolio had been 
accommodated by firm’s financial management team, combining contracted maturities 
ranging from 3 to 12 years, with the aim of establishing a best payment schedule. Despite the 
advantages posed by such dynamic allocation, a debt snowball peaking already on 2 years 
following 2009 intrinsically linked to the strategic congruence of the firm had been raised 
that, would had remained unnoticed if economy expansion continued.  
 
Figure 4. Holcim and Lafarge CDS quotations on April 2009 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
As already seen, because payback periods over the firm’s projects were usually greater 
than 5 years, Cimpor often sourced for facilities providing longer maturities. 
Such rational behind maturity scheduling were considered as being good, providing 
that debt instruments comprising large bullet payments on maturities lower than 5 years were 
neither contracted nor issued on the meantime. Because Cimpor had contracted long term 
liabilities on dates already close to the bullet repayment of the Eurobonds, it saw its financial 
outflow forecasts for the year 2011 escalate to figures higher than EUR 800 million. Taking 
into consideration EBITDA generated on 2008, and given that investment pattern of the last 
years preceding 2009 beginning were expected not to change due to a set of new investments 
that were already planned for that year, a 2008 year marked by a credit supply crunch did not 
made management team back down while considering the challenge of going to the credit 
market in order to contract or refinance maturities at excruciating costs of debt. 
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Such problem might have not entirely been due to management indulgence regarding 
these matters. As the capital markets demand, players who survive are those who are better 
equipped to sustained heavy and intensive muscle load without suffering from cramps. In this 
industry specifically, timely debt cost allocation to the future, either by refinances or bullet 
contracts arose from the firm’s growth model. Because growth objectives required asset 
acquisition, the firm required further debt in order to finance its growth and avoid being 
acquired. Therefore, planning to use revenues generated from such investments to cover costs 
associated to financing where the roll margin serving as base for financial planning.  
Whenever repayment was close to EBITDA generated, postponing expenditure 
effectuation was then the main option for the firm. As a consequence, bullet payments, as also 
debt costs, instead of being eliminated, were added to subsequent periods. While the market is 
booming, usually refinancing outstanding contracts were granted at competitive yields, such 
as the example of the Bilateral Loan S.T. contracted with a face value of EUR 392 million on 
2005, refinanced on 2008 with a maturity of 2 years and a floating rate of Euribor plus a fixed 
Spread indexed to long term S&Ps credit rating, observable on Table 5 bellow. 
 
Table 5. Cimpor major contracts indexed spread tables on 2008  
 
Club Deal 1 (280 M) Club Deal 2 (225 M) Club Deal 3 (200 M) Bilateral ST 300 M 
Rating BBB BBB- BB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BBB BBB- BB+ 
Spread 0,28% 0,30% 0,60% 0,75% 0,95% 1,45% 0,28% 0,30% 0,60% 0,55% 0,85% 0,85% 
Source: Cimpor loan contracts
4
; Company documentation
5
 
 
On 2008, creditors were already demonstrating risk aversive behavior, leading 
maturities for the refinancing contracts become shorter. That was the case for the Bilateral 
Loan ST refinancing on 2008, which was renegotiated for a term of only 2 years. By 
analyzing Figure 5 bellow, it is possible to see the debt cake fermenting its maturities and face 
value over time as expansion proceeded at the cost of issued and contracted debt.  
Over betting on uncertain outcomes can lead to off chart results, on both ends of the 
chart. This fact becomes even more important when considering investments in emergent 
economies. When compared to the currency by which the company reported its results, 
distributed its cash dividends and paid its major debt obligations (Euro), emerging market 
currencies were usually not only weaker, which would represent an advantage if the product 
manufactured at discount were not inevitably sold on a local basis, but also were subject to 
outside risk factors such as periodic hyperinflation, political, social and so on and so forth.  
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Proportional to company expansion, the apparent 10-12 years long term maturities 
accounting for less than 500 million Euros over company’s total debt portfolio on 2002 
observed on Table 4, had slowly kept growing until reaching in 2008 nearly 2.000 million 
Euros in not so longer maturities. This evidence directly reflects an antagonistic effect 
deriving from the snow ball. As the company decreased its systematic risk through geographic 
diversification, because it often resourced to debt for meeting expansion requirements, credit 
risk had been raised on a similar amount. 
 
Figure 5. Cimpor snowball effect over debt amounts and maturities (Exchange rate used 
for converting USD to EUR on the USPP instruments retrieved on issuance date) 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports 2002-2008
4
;
 
Company documentation
5
 
 
So, in resume, what started to be a business facing the risk of cement consumption 
slow down, turned out on the beginning of 2009 to be a business comprising a large debt 
snowman of more than EUR 2.000 million raised from continually procrastinated aggregated 
debt expenses, already with a life of its own as banks, the main source of firms credit, were 
displaying signs of increased bargaining power when compared to 2002. 
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Comparing Cimpor’s behavior with that of its major competitors Lafarge and Holcim 
framed in Figure A9, an establishment of the difference between Holcim’s consolidative 
organic growth supplied by firm’s own generated capital and growth by acquisition at the debt 
expense growth model undertaken by Cimpor and its relatively much larger player Lafarge 
can be inferred. Due to the intrinsic characteristic of the cement industry, for the juvenile 
player Cimpor, growth by acquisition and concomitant debt contraction was regarded as an 
inevitable outcome. However such growth did not required to be undertaken all at the same 
time with no time to breath between each market opportunity. When looking at evidence 
displaying indebtedness over firm’s actual capacity, managers were considering at that period, 
allocating retained earnings to principal amortization. Being Cimpor a company directed 
towards yearly dividend distribution, such outcome were being hardly accepted by financially 
fragile stock holders.  
Regardless of the apparent harm, contracting debt right before economic peaks could 
also be an advantage for the player. On 2008 first half, with an expectant bullish market, 
Interbank offering rates escalation had pushed spreads to its lowest levels. On the limit, 
floating debt contracted on the top of the peak would come with the lowest possible spreads 
offered on the CDSs market, during that economic cycle. With a sudden fall on the market 
prospective trend, those same spreads escalated almost 1000% from 50 bp to nearly 500bp, 
meaning that floating rates contracted on 2008 with 27,5 bp, 55bp and 75bp with long term 
maturities  were actually posing an advantage during the credit crunch, discrediting the snow 
ball menace. 
However, creditors were aware of such matters and in order to offset this matter, there 
was usually a clause stating an interest rate revision date where, if no agreement were to be 
achieved, immediate repayment were to take place. With the possibility of a further 
downgrade over firm’s long term debt capital by this rating agency, financial management 
team were evaluating the consequences that would arise from refinancing the contracts 
maturing with bullet payments on 2010 and 2011, questioning themselves whether a  Budyko 
effect was or was not already in motion. 
 
V. Investment grade Maintenance 
With an S&Ps long term credit rating of BBB+ on 2000, the firm saw with regard on 
February 2009, reaching the lowest investment grade rank of BBB- staying on CreditWatch 
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with negative implications until 8
th
 of May 2009, date where the rating agency would decide 
whether to left the classification unchanged, or to appoint a further downgrade. 
Low liquidity at Cimpor and Cimpor Inversiones level, where major long term 
liabilities were concentrated, along with inexistent signs of recovery on the constructions 
sector, S&Ps which were not concerned with the liquid situation of other than the core 
Portugal and Spain business units, moved forward with a downgrade over company’s long 
term debt rating from BBB to BBB-. Depreciated EBITDA generation associated with high 
volumes of debt outstanding on firm’s balance was the main reason behind the decision. 
Unexpected financial turn of events over banking sector had putted Cimpor’s competition on 
the same boat, all suffering similar downgrades as disclosed in Table 6 bellow. 
CreditWatch with negative implications implicated the possibility of a further 
downgrade to BB+ (investment grade loss) occurring. This was a very soaring paradox.  
If S&P were to undertake the decision of removing investment grade status from 
Cimpor’s, it would be because the firm was presenting a depreciated financial position. The 
illogicality on that is that one of the main causes for the firm having its liquid financial 
position depreciated arose from the previous downgrade from BBB to BBB-. Following the 
reasoning, upon investment grade loss, this position would be even more depreciated, with 
costs of debt almost doubling in some cases, which according to this pattern of action, would 
lead to another placement on Credit Watch with negative implications.  
 
Table 6. S&P debt ratings for Cimpor and its main competitors between 2002 and 2009 
spring semester  
 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
CIMPOR -Cimentos de 
Portugal, SGPS, S.A. 
BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ 
Holcim Ltd. BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ 
Lafarge Ciments S.A. BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB 
Cemex SAB de CV  BB+ BBB- BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- 
Source: Bloomberg 
  
One other inconsistency could be found on the rating system. In order to keep the 
rating unchanged upon Credit Watch removal, the firm had to renegotiate some of its 
outstanding contract covenants, meaning that besides the escalated costs arising from the 
BBB to BBB- downgrade, more costs would be added or aggravated from such 
renegotiations. The controversial matter here is that, despite the liquid situation becoming 
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even more degraded than it was before, according to S&P criteria, the risk profile of Cimpor’s 
long term debt would be allayed, leading to the desired negative implications removal and 
leaving the rating unchanged along with decreased liquidity. 
With aggravating consequences coming from the fact that the firm were at the verge of 
becoming junk bond grade, compliance with S&Ps requirements were mandatory at that time. 
 
VI. Requests and compliance 
The first demand made by S&Ps concerned the liquid situation of the holding solely.  
Cimpor’s Brazilian business unit hold in its possession an Austrian treasury bills note 
purchase worth of about 119 million Euros contracted for tax benefit purposes. Despite being 
a natural cash generator by that time, which can be verified on Figure 6 bellow, and also in 
greater detail on Table B5, cash positions and short term credit lines associated to the 
Brazilian business unit were not taken into consideration for the calculation of short term 
financial position borrower. 
 
Figure 6. Cimpor business units’ contributions to Group generated EBITDA between 
2002 and 2008  
Source: Cimpor 2002-2008 Annual Reports
4
; Company documentation
5 
 
Taking that into consideration, one of the firm’s management main goals was to find a 
way of transferring liquidity packages from its subsidiaries, directly to the debt core. 
One of the main factors contributing for the firm’s illiquid profile came from an 
acquisition performed on Spanish soil, aimed to increase storage capacity on the Canaries 
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Islands for a large amount of a cement intermediary product already produced and stored, 
which were beginning to depreciate through unsustainable warehousing.  
With the forecasts of OECD by 2008 end predicting an economic contraction in the 
Euro zone of approximately 3,2%, added exposure to Spanish risk had made S&Ps very 
resilient over Cimpor’s country risk exposure and future EBITDA. 
Going against S&P advice, this acquisition took place on the 31
st
 December of 2008, 
leading to a frame where no EBITDA was generated from the acquisition on accounts closing 
date, having only liabilities outstanding in its balance sheet. In order to offset this problematic 
accounting unbalance, a pro-forma EBITDA representing EBITDA generated during the year 
of acquisition by the previous owner, was transacted to the buyer’s sheet in the form of this 
special account created uniquely for such purpose. For liquidity assessment by S&Ps and 
before going forward with its decision, the pro-forma EBITDA also respective to Indian and 
Chinese acquisitions were added to the liquid situation of the Group. 
Still regarding Liquidity, S&Ps also considered Cimpor to have low levels of 
commercial paper and overdraft short term credit lines available, when compared to net 
financial debt outstanding. As means of offsetting this problem, renegotiations concerning 
commercial paper lines were being undertaken by the firm, accommodating at the same time a 
new contract for a new commercial paper program of 300 million Euros committed credit 
lines, starting with 75 million Euros being already committed at proposal date by the leader. 
Increasing overdrafts was also a short term planning objective, provided that the cost of 
maintaining those lines of on-demand credit was equal or lower than the costs incurred from 
sustaining a downgrade.  
The negotiations concerning a previous commercial program with 1 year of existence 
and the negotiation of the new program are disclosed in more detail on Annex II, located in 
Appendix C.  
 Most important debt contracts outstanding on Cimpor’s balance sheet had as told 
before, financial covenants aiming to assure repayment ability by the borrower. Of the many 
contractual protective terms, the most important concerned covenants aiming to restrain the 
ability to contract debt above certain pre established levels associated to its ability to generate 
funds for meeting contractual obligations. The Net Debt/EBITDA financial ratio was one of 
them. By imposing a maximum limit of 3,5x over this ratio, creditors and debt holders were 
able to control the ability of the firm to repay capital plus interest, also including the pro-
forma component.  
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One other covenant was the EBITDA/Net interest, with minimum limit of 5x, inserted 
with the objective of restraining operational margins to certain levels of efficiency, and a 
subsidiary indebtedness restriction aimed to oblige the holding to comply with the previously 
disclosed demands regarding the maintenance of certain levels of debt. 
 On the year of 2009 it was expected by Cimpor’s management team that the second 
financial ratio above disclosed would not represent much of a liability. However, with 
financial costs escalating on the following year of 2010 and providing that no reliable 
EBITDA trend would occur, the value corresponding to this item could decrease from the 
current 6,889x to a value much closer to its limit, which would implicate further action from 
S&Ps similar to the one stated so far. 
Because lenders intended to indirectly control borrower’s ability to fulfill contractual 
obligations, the Net Debt/EBITDA limit clause would be discredited if a subsidiary 
indebtedness limit was not imposed, whenever the borrower was a mother company and not a 
subsidiary itself.  Therefore, a subsidiary indebtedness clause had been inserted in the USPPs 
contract for an upper level limit of 10% consolidated subsidiary assets.  
  
Figure 7. Holcim 2009 March Euro bond issuance in detail 
Source: Privately Held Reports
5 
 
On the beginning of 2009, the Net Debt/EBITDA ratio was closing to the 3,5x limit, 
contributing already by 2008, with a value of 2,9x, disclosed on Table B6 data. S&Ps 
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demands therefore were directed towards the renegotiation of this limit present in contracts 
namely the USPPs and the Bilateral Loan S.T. This would no doubt impose serious increase 
over financial outflows given. Through benchmarking from an emission of EUR 500 million, 
representing approximately 5% of Holcim debt portfolio on the beginning of 2009 disclosed 
on Figure 7 above, yielding at a coupon rate of 9%, Cimpor who was planning a similar 
issuance in order to refinance the EUR 300 million Bilateral Loan S.T., were already counting 
with a coupon of approximately 12% annually. Such forecast would not imply a highly 
competitive disadvantage if sustaining a similar dimension as Holcim had, given that an 
emission of such amount would represent 25% of Cimpor’s long term liabilities. 
The reasons behind such demand by the rating agency came from the consequence of 
crossing ratio limits. In the advent of failure to comply with contract terms, Cimpor would 
automatically be in technical default and from that, a major problem would be posed to 
Cimpor’s going concern. Because all debt contracts had cross default covenants, some 
delimiting minimum limits over amounts defaulted, some not, an official default over one 
single contract would imply an echo over all Cimpor’s outstanding debt contracts in a chain 
reaction model of successive defaults, similar to a nuclear debt bomb detonating the company 
perspectives for the future by erasing firm’s assets through alienation in order to comply with 
such obligations.  
Additional information regarding the negotiations process regarding the USPP’s 
financial covenant can be found in Annex III, located in Appendix C. 
Rating triggers could also be present in contract terms. These clauses aimed to set the 
contract to default whenever the company’s debt crossed the investment grade barrier to junk 
bond. On 2003, through contract comparison and benchmark of a previously outstanding 
syndicated loan, USPPs investors noticed a rating trigger clause on that relevant contract. As a 
result, USPPs investors also demanded such clause to be inserted on the proposed contract. 
Following negotiations culminated with the insertion of a clause stating that in the event of 
insertion on any other contract of a rating trigger, USPPs investors would be immediately 
informed and a similar clause would be added to the underlying contracts.  
The interest in removing that trigger from a longer maturity contract came to be highly 
valuable for the firm, since by the end of 2008 the situation was not the same as it were in 
2003. In order to execute a new project taking place on the Turkish Business unit at the cost 
of internal generated capital plus a financing from EIB in the value of EUR 50 million was 
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objected to take place on 2009, a contract was firstly drafted by the borrower with a rating 
trigger clause inserted in it. 
With the notion that this would imply having to disclose also a rating trigger over the 
USPPs contract, which would be outstanding until 2015, Cimpor refused the proposal, which 
resulted in a new proposal demanding a Banking Guarantee and Indemnity Deed contract as a 
way of assuring Cimpor’s compliance with contractual. 
Annex IV of Appendix C displays further details regarding this specific contract. 
Following the above referred contract restrictions, all tree Club Deals had a covenant 
restricting borrower indebtedness with a lower bound limit. The clause defined that Cimpor 
Inversiones, responsible for Group’s geographic expansion, had to have at least 75% of total 
aggregated financial of the Cimpor Inversiones’s Group.  
With the contract still being on negotiation process, convergence of expectations was 
very important for its success. 
 
VII. A hard road yet to be travelled ahead 
On 2009 Cimpor was becoming more and more willing to issue bond instruments as a 
way of avoiding as much as possible loan contraction from banking institutions. With only the 
disadvantage of being issued at a fixed rate and having principal to be repaid in bullet, these 
facilities presented better and attractive options for external fund raising, as most of those 
constraints could be swapped on the market. 
Perverse incentives raised from adverse selection were strangling the corporate neck, 
characterized also by an inconspicuous snow ball effect of consecutive worsening of credit 
conditions intrinsically linked to the parameters by which S&Ps applied downgrades were the 
main challenges to be overcome by firm’s managers. Risk management theory dictated that as 
credit risk increases, so shall the interest rates underlying such risky contracts or securities. 
However, this axiom was starting to be considered highly irrational. Given that by demanding 
such higher rates, creditors were actually increasing the odds of default occurring by 
squeezing company’s decreased revenues from a contractive economic environment, not 
allowing it to operate normally and efficiently in order to fulfill those same characteristics.  
Regardless of the above situation, the fact remained that debt cost escalation were 
almost a promise for bullet contracts being renegotiated with investors willingly desiring to be 
repaid unless financial sector recovery were announced. State intervention through CGD 
social capital participation as last resort was not excluded from the agenda, especially in the 
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case of events turning spiral down as opposed to expectations. Expectations implied that, 
credit rating could be shifted to Portuguese state rating at 2009 beginning of AA- , eliminating 
this way all the challenges that the firm was facing concerning financing costs.  
However, that situation was still on the far horizon for Cimpor and the fact remained 
that with a downgrade on long term debt, Cimpor would had to start taking decisions between 
changing cash allocation patterns from investment in order to successfully deleverage the firm 
and through that, benefit from auspicious negotiated outcomes regarding cost of debt either 
from debt renegotiation or simple new debt contraction. Naturally, the remaining option 
implied keeping capital allocated to investments as preferred management practice, in 
accordance with specific perquisites for players operating in the building materials sector, and 
also in accordance with expectations for an economic recovery and expansion for years 
following 2009. Despite unlikely, such scenario was actually based on empirical evidence 
from past events where sudden inflationary trends took place under economic recession. 
Through state direct action over employment creation by allocating capital raised either from 
taxes or country debt, to public investment which by chance was the main source of revenue 
for Cimpor’s major clients.  
Not to forget was the fact that financial liabilities contracted on recession periods 
would carry on high spreads upon economic recovery, bringing even higher costs to the firm 
that could not accompany sales recovery. 
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VIII. Questions 
1. Were Cimpor’s growth prospects justifiable and sustained, or should the company had a 
slow down its expansion before 2008?  
 
2. State one possible reason for Cimpor choosing to issue Corporate Bonds in the 
transatlantic market instead of resourcing to Euro Debt. 
 
3. What advantages could Cimpor have by creating Cimpor BV instead of allocating bond 
issuance to any of its Holding and Sub-Holdings? 
 
4. Given the large portion of Euro denominated financial indebtedness outstanding on firm’s 
debt accounts, compared to debt contracted in other currencies, should Cimpor seek 
foreign debt and therefore, decrease Euro currency concentration underlying outstanding 
instruments? Should Cimpor decentralize Group financing? 
 
5. Would Cimpor’s choice to augment bond debt on its outstanding financing instruments for 
the coming years incapacitate firm’s ability to manage the Debt Snowball? 
 
6. Give one possible reason for Cimpor not having convertible debt in its portfolio. 
 
7. Elaborate a sensitivity analysis on Cimpor’s interest due on the years following 2009, for 
the debt instruments displayed on Table 2, whenever Euribor index changes 1 base point. 
 
8. What possible constraints could arise from refinancing the USPPs covenant?  Considering 
question 6, what impact would such constraints promote to future firm’s liquidity? What 
solution do you propose to this problem?  
 
 
9. Do you believe that asset sale will be required in the future to fulfill debt obligations? 
 
10. Should Cimpor use to advantage covenant negotiations to renegotiate maturities also? 
 
11. Given market juncture on 2009 beginning, what type of interest rate should Cimpor 
choose regarding the brand new EIB financing for EUR 50M (Fixed Vs. Floating rate)? 
 
12. Why did the EIB not define nor disclosed Fixed Spreads on its proposal for the contract 
mentioned on question 8? 
 
13. Are Cimpor’s expectations regarding a sudden market inflationary trend viable? 
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Appendix A 
Figure A1. International presence of Cimpor by 2009 beginning 
 
Source: Cimpor presentation 2008
5
; Company documentation
5 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Cimpor dividend payout ratio between 2002 and 2008 
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports 2002-2008
4
; Company documentation
5 
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Figure A3. Cimpor's Stock price evolution between 2003 and 2009  
( Quotations from 8.APR.2003 until 29.MAY.2009) 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4. Cimpor's stock evolution Vs. PSI20 index trend between 2003 and mid 
2007  
 
Source: Jornal de Negócios on-Line
9
; Company documentation
5 
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Figure A5. Cimpor’s shareholder structure as it was on April 2009 
 
Source: Company documentation
5
; Agência Financeira
1 
 
 
Figure A6. Euribor evolution comparison to ECB reference interest rates on 
outstanding Euro-denominated amounts to non-financial corporations with 
maturities over 1 year up to 5 years 
 
Source: €uribor
6
; European Central Bank – Eurosystem
7
; Bloomberg 
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Figure A7. Cimpor EBITDA margins, interest coverage and interest cash outflows between 2002 and 2008 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports 2002-2008
4 
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Figure A8. Cimpor Capital Employed Vs. Group yearly generated EBITDA, 
invested capital and net debt between 2002 and 2008 
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports 2002-2008
4
; Company reports
5 
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Figure A9. Cimpor EBITDA and investment pattern compared with that of Holcim and Lafarge 
(Exchange rate used for converting CHF to EUR retrieved on the 31
st
.DEC.2008) 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports 2002-2008
4
; Holcim Annual Reports 2003-2008
8
; Lafarge Annual Reports 2003-2008
10 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Cimpor resumed financial data between 2002 and 2008 
 (Monetary values in thousands of Euros. Exchange rate used for converting CHF to EUR retrieved on the 31
st
.DEC.2008) 
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 – 2008
4
; Holcim Annual Reports 2003-2008
8
; Lafarge Annual Reports 2003-2008
10 
; Company documentation
5 
 
Resumed Income Statement 
Holcim Lafarge Cimpor 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Operational Revenue 16.934.127 19.033.000 2.088.900 1.966.100 1.638.900 1.534.800 1.365.600 1.360.900 1.317.200 
Costs and Expenses -13.336.205 -14.595.000 -1.502.600 -1.359.100 -1.075.800 -1.039.000 -906.900 -848.400 -805.800 
EBITDA 3.597.921 4.438.000 586.300 607.000 563.100 495.800 458.700 512.500 511.400 
Depreciation & Amortization -1.336.178 -1.076.000 -193.700 -168.900 -155.050 -140.400 -210.500 -223.500 -227.600 
EBIT 2.261.743 3.362.000 392.600 438.100 408.050 355.400 248.200 289.000 283.800 
Financial revenue 12.790 216.000 138.627 100.490 94.147 112.749 91.778 - - 
Interest and financial losses -666.406 -1.157.000 -187.816 -158.794 -167.628 -152.972 -138.597 -45.830 -28.439 
Results from affiliates 154.149 -3.000 -86.735 8.025 19.146 35.211 39.039 7.051 3.760 
Results from financial investment 182.420 - 1.537 2.291 12.035 1.756 1.049 3.264 1.349 
EBT 1.944.695 2.418.000 258.213 390.112 365.750 352.144 241.469 253.485 260.470 
Taxes -446.290 -479.000 -24.900 -69.341 -60.140 -75.695 -52.881 -72.633 -40.646 
Net Income 1.498.405 1.939.000 233.313 320.771 305.610 276.449 188.588 180.852 219.824 
Net income attributable to shareholders 1.199.531 1.598.000 2.194.000 304.073 291.915 266.159 256.150 173.622 214.751 
Earnings per share 4,59 8,27 0,33 0,45 0,44 0,40 0,38 0,28 0,27 
Number of Shares Outstanding (units) 263.586.090 195.236.534 672.000.000 672.000.000 672.000.000 672.000.000 672.000.000 672.000.000 672.000.000 
Dividends paid (in Euros) 584.283.579 784.000.000 153.235.000 143.951.000 127.191.000 120.299.000 113.465.000 104.568.000 86.807.000 
Dividend per Share 1,51 2,00 0,19 0,23 0,22 0,19 0,18 0,16 0,17 
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Table B1.1. Cimpor resumed financial data between 2002 and 2008 
 (Monetary values in thousands of Euros. Exchange rate used for converting CHF to EUR retrieved on the 31
st
.DEC.2008) 
Resumed Balance Sheet 
Holcim Lafarge Cimpor 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Non Current Assets 23.693.776  32.928.000  3.720.666  3.680.155  2.866.789  2.725.472  2.725.472  2.271.037 2.388.102 
Current Assets 6.727.339  7.680.000  894.589  1.153.813  991.022  685.995  685.995  818.135 949.757  
Shareholders’ Equity 12.098.978  14.635.000  1.615.786  1.899.281  1.653.736  1.222.918  1.222.918  960.586  949.577 
Non Current Liabilities 7.246.328  17.043.000  2.418.411  1.928.574  1.849.476  1.758.163  1.758.163  1.213.620  989.433  
Current Liabilities 11.075.809  8.930.000  581.059  1.006.113  354.599  430.386  430.386  570.913 1.007.655  
Net Financial Debt 10.128.704  16.884.000  1.862.600  1.359.300  865.600  1.079.400  1.312.300  1.238.500  1.148.900  
Financial Ratios 
Holcim Lafarge Cimpor 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Current ratio 0,61 0,86 1,54 1,15 2,79 1,59 1,59 1,43 0,94 
Total Debt ratio 60,23% 63,96% 64,99% 60,71% 57,13% 64,15% 64,15% 68,90% 71,55% 
Times Interest ratio 0,42 2,09 1,37 2,46 2,18 2,30 1,74 5,53 9,16 
Cash Coverage ratio -0,91 1,98 1,06 1,70 1,51 1,41 0,27 1,43 1,98 
Debt-Equity ratio 1,51 1,77 1,86 1,55 1,33 1,79 1,79 1,86 2,10 
Asset Turnover ratio 55,67% 46,87% 45,26% 40,67% 42,48% 44,99% 40,03% 44,05% 39,46% 
Capital Intensity ratio 1,80 2,13 2,21 2,46 2,35 2,22 2,50 2,27 2,53 
Profit Margin -0,67% 10,19% 11,17% 16,32% 18,65% 18,01% 13,81% 13,29% 16,69% 
ROA -0,37% 4,77% 5,06% 6,64% 7,92% 8,10% 5,53% 5,85% 6,59% 
ROE 10,40% 13,25% 13,30% 18,10% 18,90% 19,70% 19,30% 19,50% 17,30% 
ROI -0,37% 8,80% 10,40% 11,60% 13,10% 12,10% 9,70% 10,30% 9,90% 
Net Debt/EBITDA 4,18 3,80 3,18 2,24 1,54 2,18 2,86 2,42 2,25 
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 – 2008
4
; Holcim Annual Reports 2003-2008
8
; Lafarge Annual Reports 2003-2008
10 
; Company documentation
5 
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Table B2 Cimpor outstanding liabilities structure on the 31
st
 of December of each year between 2002 and 2008 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
 
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Long Term Liabilities:               
        Bonds 883.055 855.939 885.239 920.263 881.216 344.709 - 
Bank Loans 1.028.075 467.993 471.536 4.896.955 418.132 844.718 958.933 
Other Loans - 315 630 5.797 8.952 8.383 9.630 
Subtotal 1.911.130 1.324.247 1.357.405 1.417.015 1.308.273 1.197.810 968.564 
                
Short Term Liabilities:               
        Bank Loans 201.177 623.142 52.578 33.891 153.883 331.069 552.072 
Other Loans 324 340 7.678 2.650 2.403 2.531 304 
Subtotal 201.501 623.482 60.256 36.541 156.287 333.604 552.376 
Total 2.112.631 1.947.729 1.417.661 1.453.556 1.464.560 1.531.411 1.520.941 
 
Source:
 
Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 – 2008
4
; Company documentation
5 
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Table B3 Cimpor's outstanding Bond values accrued on the 31
st
 of December of each year between 2002 and 2008 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
Issuer Debt Instrument Issuance Date Maturity 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Cimpor Financial Operations B.V. Eurobonds 27.May.04 27.May.11 608.107 597.598 596.903 596.202 595.500 - - 
Cimpor Financial Operations B.V. US Private Placements 10Y 27.Jun.03 27.Jun.13 102.762 96.352 106.073 118.977 105.153 127.986 - 
Cimpor Financial Operations B.V. US Private Placements 12Y 27.Jun.03 27.Jun.15 172.186 161.989 182.263 205.084 180.563 216.723 - 
   
Total 883.055 855.939 885.239 920.263 881.216 344.709 - 
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 – 2008
4
; Company documentation
5 
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Table B3.1 Cimpor's outstanding long term Banks Loans accrued on the 31
st
 of December of each year between 2002 and 2008 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
Long Term Debt Instrument Currency Interest Rate 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 0,50% - - - - - - 48.000 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 0,75% - - - - - - 150.000 
Syndicated Loan EUR Euribor* + 0,50% - - - - 300.000 300.000 - 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 0,675% - - - - - 250.000 250.000 
Syndicated Loan EUR Euribor + 0,40% - - - - - 94.503 283.509 
EIB Loan EUR EIB** basic rate 40.000 46.667 53.334 60.000 60.000 60.000 - 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 0,60% - - 8.702 14.502 15.833 50.000 50.000 
Bilateral Loan EGP Caibor*** + 1,125% - - - - - 20.998 26.773 
Syndicated Loan USD Libor**** + 0,40% - - - - - 19.794 71.517 
Bilateral Loan BRL Several 7.280 13.043 16.636 11.178 11.101 9.412 - 
Bilateral Loan USD Libor**** + 1,00% - - - - - 4.750 11.919 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 1,50% - - - 9.375 15.625 3.508 - 
Bilateral Loan  MZM TAM***** + 5,25% - - - 1.415 4.701 6.797 9.849 
Bilateral Loans EUR Several - - - - - - 31.192 
Bilateral EGP 11,70% - - - - 62 - - 
Bilateral Loans ZAR Several - - - - 261 - - 
Bilateral Loans EUR Several 72.022 126.676 364 1.985 10.549 - - 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 0,275% - - 392.500 392.500 - - - 
Bilateral Loan CVE Several 11 49 - - - - - 
Bilateral Loans CNY Several - 930 - - - - - 
Bilateral Loans PEN Several 1.107 628 - - - - - 
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*European Interbank Offering Rate 
**European Investment Bank 
***Cairo Interbank Offering Rate 
****London Interbank Offering Rate 
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 - 2008
4
; Company documentation
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B3.1 Cimpor's 2008 end outstanding long term Bank Loans accrued on the 31
st
 of December of each year between 2002 and 2008 
continued 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
Long Term Debt Instrument Currency Interest Rate 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
          
Bilateral Loan INR 10,50% 14.838 - - - - - - 
Bilateral Loan MAD Several 1.667 - - - - - - 
Club Deal 1 EUR Euribor + 0,275% 280.000 280.000 - - - - - 
Club Deal 2 EUR Euribor + 0,75% 111.997 - - - - - - 
Club Deal 3 EUR Euribor + 0,275% 199.627 - - - - - - 
Bilateral Loan ST EUR Euribor + 0,55% 299.526 - - - - - - 
Sundry Finance - - - - - - - 24.953 26.172 
    Subtotal 1.028.075 467.993 471.536 490.955 418.132 844.715 958.931 
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Table B3.2 Cimpor's 2008 end outstanding short term Bank Loans accrued on the 31
st
 of December of each year between 2002 and 2008 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
Short Term Debt Instrument Currency Interest Rate 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Syndicated Loan EUR Euribor + 0,40% - - - - - 189.006 189.006 
Syndicated Loan USD Libor + 0,40% - - - - - 39.588 47.678 
Bilateral Loan USD Libor + 1,00% - - - - 4.512 2.491 5.721 
Bilateral Loans BRL Several 2.626 3.215 3.722 3.608 3.068 2.486 - 
Bilateral Loan EGP Caibor + 1,125% - - 4.351 4.411 3.958 2.099 - 
Bilateral Loan EGP 9,50% - - - - - 914 - 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 1,50% - - 3.125 6.250 6.250 501 - 
Bilateral Loan MZM TAM + 5,25% - - 1.151 2.831 3.134 1.359 - 
Sundry Finance EUR - - 5.331 5.810 8.787 6.766 11.026 15.140 
Overdrafts - - 43.082 20.970 24.955 7.928 34.320 81.597 28.040 
Syndicated Loan EUR Euribor + 0,40% - - - - - - 135.000 
Commercial Paper EUR Euribor + 0,25% - - - - - - 106.000 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 0,40% - - - - - - 15.014 
Bilateral Loan USD Libor + 6m + 0,75% - - - - - - 10.471 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 0,675% - - - - 87.500 - - 
Bilateral Loan EGP 11,70% - - - 76 520 - - 
Bilateral Loans EUR Several - - - - 3.496 - - 
Bilateral Loans ZAR Several - - - - 358 - - 
EIB Loan EUR EIB basic rate 6.666 6.666 6.666 - - - - 
Bilateral Loan MAD TMP BDT 5a + 1,5% 385 6.458 2.798 - - - - 
Bilateral Loan EUR Euribor + 0,275% - 
392.50
0 
- - - - - 
Bilateral Loan ZAR Several - 43 - - - - - 
Bilateral Loans CNY Several 3.138 20.756 - - - - - 
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Table B3.2 Cimpor's 2008 end outstanding short term Bank Loans accrued on the 31
st
 of December of each year between 2002 and 2008 
continued 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
Short Term Debt Instrument Currency Interest Rate 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Bilateral Loans PEN Several 232 7.203 - - - - - 
Commercial Paper EUR Several 25.000 160.000 - - - - - 
Club Deal 2 EUR 
Euribor + 
0,750% 
112.409 - - - - - - 
Bilateral Loan EUR Several 7.619 - - - - - - 
Bilateral Loans CVE Several 19 - - - - - - 
  
 
Total 201.176 623.142 52.578 33.891 153.882 331.067 552.070 
    Total 1.229.251 1.091.135 524.114 524.846 572.014 1.175.782 1.511.001 
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 – 2008
4
; Company documentation
5 
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Table.B4. Cimpor’s outstanding debt displayed by original contracted currencies at the 31
st
 of December of each year between 2002 and 
2008 
(Monetary values in thousands of EUR) 
 
31.DEC.2008 31.DEC2007 31.DEC.2006 31.DEC.2005 
Currency Currency Value Converted to EUR Currency Value Converted to EUR Currency Value Converted to EUR Currency Value Converted to EUR 
EUR  -                1.756.268     -                1.618.871     -                1.070.363     -                1.083.529    
USD            404.000                     290.292               404.000                     274.438               404.000                     306.765               404.009                     324.068    
EGP  -   -   -   -               98.181                       13.053               128.554                       18.989    
MZM  -   -                 5.888                           169                 39.675                        1.151         118.999.980                        4.246    
BRL              32.131                        9.906                 42.213                       16.259                 57.243                       20.358                 40.575                       14.787    
ZAR                   952                             73                   7.125                           710                   1.410                           153                   2.024                           271    
MAD              62.936                        5.586                 73.654                        6.458                 64.563                        5.818                 82.132                        7.538    
TND  -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -  
CVE            100.109                           908                 72.637                           659     -   -               14.164                           128    
TRY              65.074                       30.283                   1.112                           648     -   -   -   -  
IND          1.000.000                       14.838     -   -   -   -   -   -  
CNY              29.800                        3.138               233.176                       21.686     -   -   -   -  
PEN                5.855                        1.339                 35.131                        7.831     -   -   -   -  
Total               2.112.631                  1.947.729                  1.417.661                  1.453.556    
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Table.B4. Cimpor’s outstanding debt displayed by original contracted currencies at the 31
st
 of December of each year between 2002 and 
2008 continued 
(Monetary values in thousands of EUR) 
 
31.DEC.2004 31.DEC.2003 31.DEC.2002 
Currency Currency Value Converted to EUR Currency Value Converted to EUR Currency Value Converted to EUR 
EUR  -                1.113.009     -                1.054.617     -                1.297.225    
USD            410.146                     290.228               488.146                     411.390               137.596                     131.207    
EGP            267.920                     290.228               286.714                       36.791               160.335                       33.021    
MZM      198.333.300                       32.405         238.000.000                        8.156         725.087.741                       30.006    
BRL              51.218                        7.835               433.602                       11.898                 51.101                       13.765    
ZAR                5.392                       16.169                   1.218                           146                 74.936                        8.317    
MAD              47.297                           701                 79.463                        7.183                 41.056                        3.847    
TND  -   -                 1.873                        1.226                   4.972                        3.551    
CVE                3.266                        4.216     -   -   -   -  
TRY  -                      1.997     -   -   -   -  
IND  -   -   -   -     -  
CNY  -   -   -   -   -   -  
PEN  -   -   -   -   -   -  
Total               1.464.560                     153.411                  1.520.941    
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 – 2008
4
; Company documentation
5 
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Table B5 Cimpor's business units’ contributions to Group generated EBITDA between 2002 and 2008 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
Business Unit Year of Market entry 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Portugal 1976        171.900             172.700             173.900             183.000             175.700             210.100             174.300    
Spain 1992 
 
       82.900             137.800             143.700             102.900              88.700              84.200              55.400    
Morocco 1996 
 
       41.000              35.200              33.500              26.200              24.700              25.400              22.500    
Tunisia 1998 
 
       17.000              18.900              17.500              14.600              14.700              13.300              10.500    
Egypt 2000 
 
       73.200              58.600              63.300              48.500              29.500              21.300              16.900    
Turkey 2007 
 
       15.600              38.600                       -                       -                       -                       -                       -    
Brazil 1997 
 
     102.300              73.900              60.600              62.900              80.400             115.500             130.800    
Mozambique 1994 
 
       13.400              12.300                8.400                6.800                6.800              11.700                7.300    
South Africa 2002 
 
       46.200              43.000              47.900              41.900              39.900              31.200                5.600    
Cape Verde 2005 
 
        6.300                3.000                2.300                1.200                       -                       -                       -    
China 2007 
 
        3.100                1.800                       -                       -                       -                       -                       -    
India 2008 
 
        4.200                       -                       -                       -                       -                       -                       -    
    Total    586.300           595.800           551.100           488.000           460.400           512.700           423.300    
 
Source: Cimpor Annual Reports from 2002 – 2008
4
; Company documentation
5 
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Table B6. Cimpor major indicators calculated according to S&P criteria 
(Monetary values in thousands of Euros) 
 31.DEC.2008 
EBITDA According to S&P 
criteria 
Financial position  According to 
S&P criteria 
Net Interest according to S&P 
criteria 
Debt indebtedness according to 
S&P criteria 
Pro-forma 
EBITDA:  
Long Term Debt 201.501 Interest Expense 114.614 Debt by borrower: 
Canary Islands 25.262 Short Term Debt 1.911.130 Cash discounts granted 3.401 
Cimpor Holding 
(Portugal) 
- 
China 791 
Cash and 
equivalents 
289.365 
Losses in financial 
applications 
 
0 Cimpor Inversiones 1.004.130 
India 908 Net Debt 1.823.266 
Other financial expenses 
and losses 
10.194 Cimpor BV 883.055 
EBITDA 613.261 
  
Interest income 32.093 
Corporatción 
Noroeste (Spain) 
73.606 
    
Cash discounts obtained 716 Other companies 151.840 
    
Gains in financial 
applications 
0 Consolidated Debt 
 
2.112.631 
    
Other financial gains 6.375 Net Assets 4.615.255 
    
Net interest 89.025 
  
        
 
Source: Cimpor 2008 Annual Reports
4
; Cimpor’s S&P report
5 
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Appendix C 
 
Annex I – Organizational Structure 
The decomposition by each business area of all Cimpor’s financial debt 
outstanding by 2008 fiscal year end can be seen on the following Table C1. 
 
Table C1. Cimpor’s debt issued and contracted by the holding and its Subsidiaries 
during 2008  
Issuer and Financing 
Instrument 
Currency 
Values (in 
10^3) 
Contraction 
Date 
Maturity Interest Rate 
      
CIMPOR Inversiones           
Bilateral Loan EUR            280.000    Nov2007 Nov2012 Euribor + 0,275% 
Bilateral Loan EUR 200.000 Jan2008 Jan2013 Euribor + 0,275% 
Bilateral Loan EUR 225.000 Jun2008 Mar2011 Euribor + 0,275% 
Bilateral Loan EUR            300.000    Aug2008 Jun2010 Euribor + 0,275% 
Sundry Finance EUR 571 
   
IAS 23 impact EUR -1.441 
   
Total EUR          1.004.130          
CIMPOR B.V. 
    
  
Eurobonds EUR            600.000    May2004 May2011 4,50% 
US PP 10y USD            150.000    Jun2003 Jun2013 4,75% 
US PP 12y USD            254.000    Jun2003 Jun2015 4,90% 
 IAS 39 Impact EUR -29.054 
  
  
Total EUR 915.656          
Portugal 
    
  
CIMPOR Indústria: 
    
  
EIB* Financing EUR              46.667    Sept2003 Sept2015 EIB Basic Rate 
Commercial Paper EUR 25.000    Dec2008 Jan2009 3.29% 
Overdrafts** EUR              2    
  
  
Subtotal EUR          71.668    
  
  
Other Companies: 
    
  
Sundry Finance EUR               5.572    
  
  
Overdrafts EUR 3.486 
   
Subtotal EUR 9.058 
   
Total EUR          80.726          
Spain 
    
  
Sundry Finance EUR            73.578    
  
  
Overdrafts EUR 29 
   
Total EUR 73.607         
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Table C1. Cimpor’s debt issued and contracted by the holding and its Subsidiaries 
during 2008 (continue) 
Issuer and Financing 
Instrument 
Currency 
Values (in 
10^3) 
Contraction 
Date 
Maturity Interest Rate 
Brazil 
    
  
Sundry Finance BRL 32.131    
  
  
Total EUR 9.906          
Morocco 
    
  
Sundry Finance MAD              23.127    
   
Overdrafts MAD              39.809    
  
  
Total EUR              5.586          
Turkey 
    
  
Overdrafts EUR 4.800 
   
Overdrafts TRY               65.074    
  
  
Total EUR               35.084          
Peru 
    
  
Sundry Finance PEN               5.855    
  
  
Total EUR                 1.340          
South Africa 
    
  
Overdrafts ZAR               952  
  
  
Total EUR                 73          
China 
    
  
Sundry Finance PEN              29.800    
  
  
Total EUR              7.830          
Cape Verde  
    
  
Sundry Finance EUR                  239    
  
  
Sundry Finance CVE               3.300    
  
  
Overdrafts CVE              96.809    
  
  
Total EUR                 1.147          
India 
     
Bilateral Loan INR 1.000.000 Mar2008 Mar2011 10,50% 
Total EUR 14.838 
   
Others 
    
  
Operational Leasing EUR 6.771          
Total of the Group EUR 2.152.002          
 
*EIB refers to European Investment Bank 
** Overdrafts were mainly compose by Bank Guaranties 
 
Source: Cimpor 2008 annual report
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In order to better understand the division of outstanding debt instruments 
through subsidiaries displayed on Table C1, Figure C1 displays the main organizational 
structure of the firm.  
 
Figure C1. Cimpor organizational simplified  structure on 2009 begining 
 
Source: Cimpor 2008 annual report
4
; Company Documentation
5 
 
For a brief description of that structure and for a better global understanding of 
how this mid-large international company organizes its structure, Cimpor could be 
viewed as being the holding company of the Group, being responsible for the strategic 
growth and development of the Group as well for the global management of its business 
units, with the primary function of coordinating its financial, human and technical 
resources. In its structure, the holding incorporated the corporate center and all other 
support divisions, being responsible for four sub holdings from which it retained 100% 
participation.  
The Sub holding CIMPOR Portugal, SGPS, S.A. was responsible for managing 
Portugal business unit, a unit that could be considered as being a core unit responsible 
for 22.1% to a total of EUR 2.088,9 million turnover generated by Cimpor during the 
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2008 year. This figure includes also all the turnover contributions provided by all 
Cimpor business units during that period. This information is important to this text since 
interest payment and credit allocation relies heavily on company operational healthiness 
and therefore, revenue volumes.  
The sub holding CIMPOR Inversiones, S.A. constituted in 2002 was created to 
serve as a platform for the international expansion of the group, including 100% of 
Spanish participation. This last one received all the reports from the international 
business units appointed head managers, with the exception of the Portugal major core 
business area. 
Only the Holding and Cimpor Inversiones displayed were companies subject to 
rating by S&P debt rating system and therefore, able to issue debt instruments with 
proper rating concerning risk and return, with international reconnaissance and on 
international financial markets. The rating congruence towards the holding rating was 
being boosted mainly at the internationalization of the Group, as the Spanish market 
was experience worse conditions than those suffered by the Portuguese one, implying 
therefore a balance between both business units that resulted in long term debt rating of 
the Holding company debt being most of the times equal to its Spanish counterpart. 
Cimpor Financial Operations BV, being the issuer entity of all bond instruments 
outstanding, had as main objective to serve as a financing vehicle in order to provide 
and allocate correct financing to all Groups subsidiaries. Its activity was mainly 
characterized by raising external debt capital on financial markets. Therefore, as bond 
holders when addressing issuer health demanded financial statements of this company, 
Cimpor BV usually did not undertake neither bank loans nor intercompany loan 
contracts. This because since such ratio of frequent operations and money movement 
that would be recorded and disclosed in its results and balances could compromise 
investors view regarding financial strength of the subsidiary, undermining the ability for 
efficiently capturing financing in this markets. 
The shareholder structure for the reference period can be observed on Figure B6. 
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Annex II – Commercial Paper Programs 
On the beginning of 2009, Cimpor’s financial managers were being pressed by 
S&Ps rating agency to increase its short term available lines credit. 
In compliance with such request, given that the firm had no choice but run along 
with the rating agency demands, firm’s financial managers asked CGD for proposals, 
both for renegotiating an already outstanding commercial paper with EUR 50 million 
committed and EUR 250 million uncommitted, and also for a new program for EUR 
300 million syndicated committed lines. 
Cimpor, at 2009 beginning had as issued lines, 20 million Euros of this type of 
short term financing. Renovation of this debt was almost automatic, with a maximum 
removal length of 5 years.  
The main objective involved raising the EUR 50M committed by 350 million 
Euros. For that, CGD would have to agree with an global increase of EUR 125 million 
commitment. The remaining 225 were to be delivered on a “best effort” base, meaning 
that CGD would source the market for other entities willing to commit the credit lines. 
Proposed figures can be observed on Table C2, C3 and C4. Comparing those 
displayed on the bank proposal on the beginning of 2009 to those previously proposed 
for a similar contract, one can see some of the effects that the credit crunch was also 
posing to the short term refinancing efforts of the firm, as also the outcomes of a S&P 
downgrade over firm’s long term debt.  
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Table C2. Terms purposed by CGD for the Commercial Paper Program contracts 
and negotiations on the beginning of 2008 
Terms for the  EUR 300 M commercial paper program contracted on 2008 beginning 
 
Voucher: 
 
 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
Total lines: 
  
EUR 300 M 
Uncommitted lines: 
  
EUR 250 M 
Committed lines: 
  
EUR 50 M 
Interest rate over 
guaranteed lines: 
 
 
EURIBOR+0,45% for Committed emissions 
Emission intermediary 
agent fee: 
 
 
0,02% (Base: Actual/360) over each emission (minimum 
emission: EUR 125) 
Emission organization 
and conduct fee: 
 
 
0,02% (Base: Actual/360) over each emission (minimum 
emission: EUR 125) 
Subscription guarantee 
fee: 
 
 
0,125% over EUR 50 M 
Investment Grade 
indexation: 
 
 
Committed lines emission subject to Investment Grade 
condition 
Term: 
 
5 years with a clause stating the right to denouncement to 
be exercised annually by both parts 
 
Source: Privately Held Reports
5 
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Table C3. Terms purposed by CGD for the Commercial Paper Program contracts 
and renegotiations on the beginning of 2009 
Renegotiated terms of a) outstanding EUR 300 M commercial paper program proposed on 
the beginning of 2009 by the CGD 
 
Voucher: 
 
  Caixa Geral de Depósitos  
Total lines: 
  
EUR 300 M 
Uncommitted lines: 
  
EUR 200 M 
Committed lines: 
  
EUR 100 M 
Interest rate over 
guaranteed lines:  
  
S&P rating greater or equal 
than BBB-  
EURIBOR+1,35% for Committed emissions 
S&P rating lower than 
BBB- 
 
 
EURIBOR+1,85% for Committed emissions 
Emission intermediary 
agent fee: 
 
 
0,05% charged biannually and upfront 
Emission organization 
and conduct fee: 
 
 
0,10% charged annually and upfront 
Subscription guarantee 
fee: 
 
 
0,5% over EUR 100 M charged biannually and upfront 
Investment Grade 
indexation: 
 
 
No effect over the emission until reaching the 
guaranteed limit 
Term: 
  
5 years with a clause stating the right for an annual 
revision of the terms by both parts 
 
Source: Privately Held Reports
5 
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Table C4. Terms purposed by CGD for the Commercial Paper Program contracts 
and negotiations on the beginning of 2009 
New EUR 300 M commercial paper program proposed on the beginning of 2009 by CGD 
 
Voucher: 
 
  Caixa Geral de Depósitos  
Total lines: 
  
EUR 300 M 
Committed lines for 
syndication: 
 
 
EUR 225 M (best effort base) 
Committed lines: 
  
EUR 75 M 
Interest rate over 
Committed lines:  
  
S&P rating greater or equal 
than BBB-  
EURIBOR+2,05% for Committed emissions 
S&P rating lower than 
BBB- 
 
 
EURIBOR+2,55% for Committed emissions 
Emission intermediary 
agent fee: 
 
 
EUR 30.000 /year, charged biannually and upfront 
Emission organization 
and conduct fee: 
 
 
0,3% upfront 
Subscription guarantee 
fee: 
 
 
0,85% over EUR 75M charged biannually and upfront 
Investment Grade 
indexation: 
 
 
No effect over the emission until reaching the 
Committed limit 
Term: 
  
3 years with an annual clause stating the right for 
revision of the terms by both parts 
 
Source:
 
Privately Held Reports
5 
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Annex III 
Renegotiating the USPP Net Debt/EBITDA covenant limit of 3,5x was a priority 
for the firm on 2009 beginning upon S&P demand. The choice to renegotiate those 
covenants for these instruments maturing in 2013 and 2015 instead of renegotiating 
closer maturities came from the expectation that Cimpor’s financial managers had 
regarding firm’s ability to repay principal Bilateral Loan ST and Eurobonds principal 
maturing in 2010 over 2011 respectively. 
At 2009 beginning Cimpor had already initiated the forcing of this contract. 
Given that in fact, this was a bond instrument, negotiations with US investors 
owning the purchase notes for these debt instruments was intended to be conducted by 
an intermediate. The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), an experienced dealer with many 
similar negotiations on its repertoire, was Cimpor’s choice. 
 Table C5 displays the main expected outcomes from negotiation. Figures were 
computed by the institution based on benchmarking emissions such as the EUR 500M 
bond instrument issuance undertaken by Holcim on 2009 beginning, and also 
considering swap spreads demanded by the US Private Placements market over 
Cimpor’s industry risk, Cimpor’s credit risk, and the respective US T-bills yields at 
March 2009. 
 
Table C5. Covenant renegotiation outcomes expected by RBS on the February 
2009 
 
Maturity Currency Face Value 
Years until 
maturity 
Coupon Rate 
USPP 
10y  USD 150.000.000 4 4,75% 
12y  USD 254.000.000 6 4,90% 
Expected renegotiated outcomes 
Permanent Added 
Spread* 
Variable Added 
Spread** 
Variable Added 
Spread*** 
1,50% 1,00% 2,00% 
1,50% 1,00% 2,00% 
Expected Coupon Rates after renegotiation 
Covenant <2,5x 2,5<Covenant <3,5x Covenant >3,5x 
6,25% 7,25% 8,25% 
6,40% 7,40% 8,40% 
 
*Expected permanent increase  from renegotiating the covenant stating a Net Debt/EBITDA ratio limit of 
3,5x 
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**Added spread in the case that the Covenant Net Debt/EBITDA gets higher than 2,5x, but lower than 
3,5x. 
 
***Added spread in the case that the Covenant Net Debt/EBITDA gets higher than 3,5x. This spread will 
substitute the previous one if the condition applies 
Source:
 
Privately Held Reports
5 
 
Table C6 discloses expected cost of debt if a new issuance is performed as 
opposed to renegotiating the USPP’s outstanding on Cimpor’s debt portfolio by 2009 
beginning. 
 
Table C6. Issuance of a new fixed income instrument outcomes expected by RBS 
on the beginning of 2009 
 
Maturity Currency Face Value Years until maturity Coupon Rate 
USPP 
10y USD 150.000.000 4 4,75% 
12y USD 254.000.000 6 4,90% 
Expected refinancing outcome 
Expected Coupon Rates 
after refinance 
MTM* coupon 
step up 
UST yield 
Swap spread + Credit 
Spread 
Estimated refinancing 
coupon 
5 to 6 % 
4 years - 
1,60% 
8 to 9 % 9,75 to 10,75% 
6 to 7 % 
6 years - 
2,85% 
8 to 9% 10,90 to 11,90% 
*Mark to Market 
Additional market data:     
27th of June, 2003 (Issuance Date of the USPP Note): US Private placements market data 
        
4 years Swap Spread + Credit 
Spread: 
 
2,49
% 
4 years Swap Spread: 
0,36
% 
4 Years US T-
Bills: 
2,13
% 
6 years Swap Spread + Credit 
Spread: 
3,06
% 
6 years Swap Spread: 
0,42
% 
6 Years US T-
Bills 
2,64
% 
        
10 years Swap Spread + US T-
Bills: 
 
3,98
% 
10 years Credit 
Spread: 
0,77
%   
12 years Swap Spread + US T-
Bills: 
4,17
% 
12 Years Credit 
Spread: 
0,73
%   
Source:
 
Privately Held Reports
5
, Bloomberg 
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Annex IV 
By 2008 end, Cimpor had already planned a project to be undertaken by its 
Turkish business unit, with the objective of increasing clínquer production, a 
fundamental intermediary product required for the cement and concrete production 
process in order to get the final product. This capacity increase followed an operational 
requirement of having clínquer production evened with cement production capacity 
already mounted on that geographical area. 
This project would imply the construction of a brand new clínquer production 
plant next to an already existing milling facility responsible for originating the final 
product. 
In order to execute this project, internal generated capital plus external debt was 
required. Annex IV.1 discloses the most relevant issues of the agreement. 
Such issues had to be revised. Given Cimpor’s discomfort relative to rating 
triggers, one first draft of the agreement had to be requested for amendment. 
As a main result, a banking guarantee requiring capital plus accrued interest 
coverage was requested by the lender, covering not only principle, but also interest and 
overdue. Main differences between version prior and after agreement revisal can be 
seen in Table C7 and Table C8. The first one had been constructed by mid 2008. The 
second one relative to the rating trigger removal was revised at 2009 beginning.  
With the loan now being granted indirectly to the final borrower Cimpor Yibitas, 
an intercompany loan had to take place in order to make this funding reach the Turkish 
business unit. Such operation implicated renouncing to Turkish tax benefits, disclosed 
in Table C9. The loss of such benefits was denoted by the Turkish as an intention of 
estranging foreign companies. 
The Turkish business unit had been on 2008 responsible for a currency loss of 
nearly 100 million Euros, having the market saw its ecstasy on earlier 2007, starting 
then to lose strength until 2009. Price war threats were common ground at this area. 
Despite the Turkish business units being responsible for a large slice of the 
illiquid Cimpor’s financial position pie, sales of concrete and aggregates increased 
38.4% and 17,8% respectively, against a cement sales decrease of approximately -2,5%. 
Unit generated EBITDA on 2008 relative to the previous year saw a decrease of 59% 
following a revenue decrease of - 4,2%. Such evidence denotes the impact of price 
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completion models eroding profits to this market. Disinvestment might have crossed 
some of firm’s managers. However, investments of this magnitude involved other 
contracts than loan agreements, especially with suppliers, which had to be fulfilled. 
 
Table C7. Bank Guarantee and Indemnity Deed major proposed figures for the 
EIB 50 million Euros Loan 
 
Guarantee and Indemnity Deed key contract figures 
proposed 
 
On mid 2008 On 2009 beginning 
 
Recipient entity: 
European Investment Bank European Investment Bank 
Guaranteed entity: Cimpor Yibitas 
Cimpor Yibitas and Cimpor 
Inversiones 
 
Guarantor: Cimpor Inversiones 
Bank Entity according to EIB 
criteria of reconnaissance 
Amount 
guaranteed: 
EUR 50.000.000 
EUR 50.000.000 + Interest + 
Overdues 
 
Term of guarantee 
3 years 5 years 
Pricing: 
 
0,10% 
1,00%  
Other Conditions 
negative pledge and cross 
default 
 
- 
Financial 
covenants: 
Net Financial Debt/EBITDA < 
3,5x; EBITDA/Net financial 
expenses > 5x; 75% of 
contracted debt is required to be 
concentrated on Cimpor 
Inversiones 
- 
Source: Guarantors’ Guarantee and Indemnity Deed contract underlying the EIB contract formal proposal 
to Cimpor 
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Table C8. Main clauses and contract terms differences between the first and 
second proposed drafts for the EIB EUR 50M loan contract 
Major terms revised for rating trigger removal 
1st Proposal 
 
2nd Proposal 
Credit supplied directly to Cimpor 
Ybitas  
 
Credit supplied directly to Cimpor 
Inversiones 
 
Guarantee and Indemnity Deed: 
Guarantor - Cimpor Inversiones 
 
Guarantee and Indemnity Deed: 
Guarantor  - Bank Institution 
 
Rating Trigger 
 
No rating trigger 
 
Margin 
 
No Margin 
Unspecified maturity and terms of 
repayment (to be informed upon 
tranche disbursement) 
= 
 
Unspecified maturity and terms of 
repayment (to be informed upon 
tranche disbursement) 
Unspecified fixed rate of interest 
(to be informed upon tranche 
disbursement) 
= 
 
Unspecified fixed rate of interest (to 
be informed upon tranche 
disbursement) 
Unspecified spread of floating 
rate of interest (to be informed 
upon tranche disbursement) 
= 
 
Unspecified spread of floating rate of 
interest (to be informed upon tranche 
disbursement) 
 
Source: Privately Held Reports
5 
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Table C9. Main clauses and contract terms differences between the first and 
second proposed drafts for the EIB EUR 50M loan contract 
 
Intercompany Loan Direct Loan 
 
Through 
Cimpor 
Inversiones 
Through Cimpor 
Finance (financial 
instruments vehicle) 
Through 
foreign Bank 
Institution 
 
Tax retention over 
interest: 
10% 10% 0% 
 
Value Added Tax 
(VAT): 
 
18% 
 
18% or 0% if Cimpor 
Inversiones is a member 
of the Berne Union or if 
Spanish Tax authorities 
issued a letter referring 
that the main activity of 
this entity is financing 
concession 
 
 
0% 
Of stamp duty over 
principal: 
0,75% or 3% if 
average maturity 
lesser than 1 year 
0,75% or 0% if Cimpor 
Inversiones is a member 
of the Berne Union or if 
Spanish Tax authorities 
issued a letter referring 
that the main activity of 
this entity is financing 
concession. 3% if average 
maturity lesser than 1 
year. 
0% or 3% if 
maturity lesser 
than 1 year 
 
Source: Privately Held Reports
5 
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Annex IV.1 
 
Main issues concerning the EIB financing agreement: 
 
Contractual basis: 
Project for production capacity increase 
Lender: 
European Investment Bank 
Borrower: 
Cimpor Inversiones, SGPS, S.A. 
Maturity: 
No later than 10 years after tranche disbursement and no earlier than 4 of the same date. 
Rate of Interest: 
To be revised every 4 years. Choice of interest rate between Fixed or Floating Fixed 
Spread falls upon borrower.  
Fixed interest rates 
Payment: either biannually or annual scheduled payments 
Floating interest rates: 
Payment: either biannually or quarterly scheduled payments 
Interest rate applicable to overdue sums: 
Fixed rate and floating rate tranches: Euribor (reference: 1 month) + 2% 
Repayment of Capital: 
Fixed interest rate tranches 
Payments can be either annual or biannual of equal amounts.  
Floating interest rate tranches 
Payments can be either biannual or quarterly of equal amounts. 
Bank guarantee: 
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Shall cover: capital, interest, commissions, damages, changes and expenses, others 
Principal criteria for guarantor recognizance 
a) International long term credit rating: 
 (A-)  S&P 
 (A3) Moody’s 
 (A-) Fitch Ratings 
 
Covenants: 
Cross Default: if the defaulted amounted is higher than EUR 25 million for contracts 
outstanding for the Group and, higher than EUR 10 million for contracts outstanding 
singularly for the holding or any of its subsidiaries, borrower is required to effect 
immediate repayment of capital plus accrued interest plus indemnity fee. 
Disposal of Assets: Borrower and Subsidiaries shall not sell, transfer, lease or dispose of 
all or a substantial part of its capital assets, with the exception that such transaction 
exceeds 10% of Borrower’s fixed assets 
 
Source: Privately Held Reports
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
